Pius IX, 1846-1878

of man but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God" [I Cor. 2:7 f].

1673. Adhering to these and other almost innumerable divine texts, the Holy Fathers, in transmitting the teaching of the Church, have constantly taken care to distinguish the knowledge of divine things which is common to all by the power of natural intelligence, from the knowledge of those things which is received on faith through the Holy Spirit; and they have continuously taught that through this (faith) those mysteries are revealed to us in Christ which transcend not only human philosophy but even the angelic natural intelligence, and which, although they are known through divine revelation and have been accepted by faith, nevertheless, remain still covered by the sacred veil of faith itself, and wrapped in an obscuring mist as long as we are absent from the Lord¹ in this mortal life. From all this, it is clear that the proposition of Frohschammer is wholly foreign to the teaching of the Catholic Church, since he does not hesitate to assert that all the dogmas of the Christian religion without discrimination are the object of natural science or philosophy, and that human reason, cultivated so much throughout history, provided these dogmas have been proposed to reason itself as an object, can from its own natural powers and principle, arrive at the true understanding concerning all, even the more hidden dogmas [see n. 1709].

1674. But now, in the said writings of this author another opinion prevails which is plainly opposed to the teaching and understanding of the Catholic Church. For, he attributes that freedom to philosophy which must be called not the freedom of science but an utterly reprobate and intolerable license of philosophy. For, having made a certain distinction between a philosopher and philosophy, he attributes to a "philosopher" the right and duty of submitting himself to the authority which he himself has approved as true, but he denies both (right and duty) to philosophy, so that taking no account of revealed doctrine he asserts that it (philosophy) ought never and can never submit itself to authority. And this might be tolerable and perhaps admissible, if it were said only about the right which philosophy has to use its own principles or methods, and its own conclusions, as also the other sciences, and if its liberty consisted in employing this right in such a way that it would admit nothing into itself which had not been acquired by it under its own conditions, or was foreign to it. But, such true freedom of philos-