Leo XIII, 1878–1903

The Duel ¹

[From the Letter, "Pastoralis Officii," to the Bishops of Germany and Austria, Sept. 12, 1891]

1939. The two divine laws, that which is promulgated by the light of natural reason, and that by letters written under divine inspiration, strictly forbid the killing or wounding of anyone outside a public cause, unless forced by necessity to defend his own safety. But those who provoke to a private struggle, or accept a challenge do this; they lend their minds and their strength to this, although bound by no necessity, to take the life, or at least to inflict a wound on an adversary. Furthermore, the two divine laws forbid anyone rashly casting aside his own life, subjecting it to grave and manifest danger, when no reason of duty, or of magnanimous charity urges it; but this blind rashness, contemner of life, is clearly in the nature of a duel. Therefore, it can be obscure and doubtful to no one that upon those who engage in individual combat privately, fall both crimes, that of another's destruction, and of voluntarily endangering his own life. Finally, there is scarcely any affliction which is more at variance with the good order of civil life, than the license permitted a citizen to be his own individual defender of the law by private force, and the avenger of honor which he thinks has been violated.

1940. Nor do those who accept combat when it is offered have fear as a just excuse, because they dread to be held cowards in public if they decline battle. For, if the duties of men were to be measured by the false opinions of the public, there would be no natural and true distinction according to an eternal norm of right and justice between honest actions and shameful deeds. Even the pagan philosophers knew and taught that the false judgments of the public are to be spurned by a strong and stable man. Rather is the fear just and sacred, which turns a man away from unjust slaughter, and makes him sollicitous of his own safety and that of his brothers. Surely, he who spurns the valid judgments of the public, who prefers to undergo the scourges of contumely than to abandon duty in any matter, this man, surely, is of a far greater and higher mind than he who when annoyed by an injury rushes to arms. Yes, indeed, if there is a desire for right judgment, he is the one in whom stout fortitude shines, that fortitude, I say, which is truly called a virtue and whose companion is glory, not counterfeited and not false. For virtue consists in a good in accord with reason, and all glory is foolish except that which depends on the judgment of God who approves.