Pius X, 1903-1914

where except in the heart of the believer, since it is the object of sense and of affirmation, and so does not exceed the confines of phenomena; furthermore, whether that reality exists in itself outside that sense and affirmation, the philosopher passes over and neglects. On the other hand for the modernist believer it is established and certain that the reality of the divine definitely exists in itself, and certainly does not depend on the believer. But if you ask on what then the assertion of the believer rests, they will reply: In the personal experience of every man.—In this affirmation, while they break with the rationalists, to be sure, yet they fall in with the opinion of Protestants and pseudomystics [cf. n. 1273]. For they explain the subject as follows: that in the religious sense a kind of intuition of the heart is to be recognized, by which man directly attains the reality of God, and draws from it such conviction of the existence of God and of the action of God both within and without man, that it surpasses by far all conviction that can be sought from science. They establish, then, a true experience and one superior to any rational experience. If anyone, such as the rationalists, deny this, they say that this arises from the fact that he is unwilling to establish himself in the moral state which is required to produce the experience. Furthermore,

2082. this experience, when anyone has attained it, properly and truly makes a believer.—How far we are here from Catholic teachings. We have already seen [cf. n. 2072] such fabrications condemned by the Vatican Council. When these errors have once been admitted, together with others already mentioned, we shall express below how open the way is to atheism. It will be well to note at once that from this doctrine of experience joined with another of symbolism, any religion, not even excepting paganism, must be held as true. For why should not experiences of this kind not occur in any religion? In fact, more than one asserts that they have occurred. By what right will modernists deny the truth of an experience which an Islamite affirms, and claim true experiences for Catholics alone? In fact, modernists do not deny this; on the contrary some rather obscurely, others very openly contend that all religions are true. But it is manifest that they cannot think otherwise. For on what basis, then, should falsity have been attributed to any religion according to their precepts? Surely it would be either because of the falsity of the religious sense or because a false formula was set forth by the intellect. Now the religious sense is always one and the same, although sometimes it is more imperfect; but that the intellectual formula be true, it is enough that it respond to the religious sense and to the human believer, whatever may be the character of the perspicacity of the latter. In the conflict of different religions the modernists might be able to contend for one thing at most, that the Catholic religion, inasmuch as it is the more vivid, has more truth; and likewise that it is more worthy of the name