Pius XII, 1939–

faith, and also in collecting usefully and securely the fruits of sound progress.¹

2323. For this reason it is to be exceedingly deplored that the philosophy accepted and recognized within the Church is today held in scorn by some; so much so that it is impudently renounced as antiquated in form, and rationalistic, as they say, in its process of thinking. For they insist that this philosophy of ours defends the false opinion that an absolutely true metaphysics can exist, while on the other hand they assert that things, especially the transcendent, cannot be expressed more aptly than by disparate doctrines, which complement each other, although, in a manner they are opposed to each other. So, they concede that the philosophy of our schools, with its clear description and solution of questions, with its accurate demarcation of notions and clear distinctions, can indeed be useful for a training in scholastic theology, well accommodated to the minds of men of the Middle Ages, but does not offer a system of philosophizing which corresponds with our modern culture and its needs. Then they raise the objection that an unchanging philosophy is nothing but a philosophy of immutable essences, while the modern mind must look to the "existence" of individual objects, and to life, which is always in a state of flux. While they despise this philosophy, they extol others, whether ancient or modern, whether of the peoples of the Orient or of the Occident, so that they seem to insinuate that any philosophy or belief with certain additions, if need be, as corrections or supplements, can be reconciled with Catholic dogma. No Catholic can doubt that this is quite false, especially since it involves those fictions which they call "immanence," or "idealism," or "materialism," whether historic or dialectic, or even "existentialism," whether professing atheism, or at least rejecting the value of metaphysical reasoning.

2324. And, finally, they find this fault with the traditional philosophy of our Schools, namely, that in the process of cognition it is concerned only with the intellect, and overlooks the function of the will, and of the affections of the mind. This certainly is not true. For never has Christian philosophy denied the usefulness and the efficacy of the good disposition of the entire mind for fully comprehending and embracing religious and moral truths; on the other hand, it has always taught that the lack of such dispositions can be the cause of the intellect becoming affected by disordered desires and an evil will, and of being so obscured that it does not see rightly. On the other hand the Common Doctor is of the opinion that the intellect can in some way perceive the higher goods that pertain to the moral order, whether natural or supernatural, since it experiences in the mind a kind of passionate "relationship" with these goods, whether